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Death by a Thousand Cuts: How the 
Supreme Court Has Effectively Killed 
Campaign Finance Regulation by Its 
Limited Recognition of Compelling State 
Interests1 
KEVIN R. HUGUELET* 
This Article examines the current campaign finance juris-
prudence in the United States, with a particular emphasis on 
the Court’s recognition of compelling state interests. Given 
the limited recognition of compelling state interests, this Ar-
ticle seeks to question the seemingly arbitrary rationale be-
hind recognition and explore the implications of minimal ac-
ceptance of compelling state interests. Because the evolution 
of compelling state interest recognition has varied greatly, 
the Court’s recent insistence — that the state has merely one 
compelling interest — is troublesome. This Article provides 
a comprehensive review of the campaign finance jurispru-
dence, then reviews the decisions that created or argued for 
additional compelling state interests. Interests that were 
considered compelling prior to Citizens United, such as the 
                                                                                                             
* B.A. 2012, Creighton University; J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Miami 
School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Frances R. Hill for her invaluable 
feedback and assistance throughout the writing of this Comment. 
 1 During oral arguments in the case of Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011), Justice Breyer characterized the state 
of campaign finance regulation as nearly dead. He said, “It is better to say [cam-
paign finance regulation is] all illegal than to subject these things to death by a 
thousand cuts, because we don’t know what will happen when we start tinkering 
with one provision rather than another.” See Adam Liptak, Justices Review Ari-
zona Law on Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.ny-
times.com/2011/03/29/us/politics/29scotus.html?_r=0. 
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anti-distortion interest, remain compelling and hold an im-
portant place in the US campaign finance landscape. This 
Article attempts to respond to the current Court’s trend and 
shed light on the history of compelling state interest recog-
nition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a child, most evenings I sat on the couch with my parents to 
watch the news. At best, nightly news in Chicago can be described 
as depressing. However, the most unnerving news segments were 
those displaying elected officials as they marched into court to stand 
trial for some form of corruption.2 
In Illinois, more than 1,800 individuals were convicted for pub-
lic corruption from 1976 to 2012.3 This bleak reality breeds a sense 
of skepticism and distrust among the electorate,4 especially for those 
                                                                                                             
 2 In the interest of space, this will be only a partial listing of the group: 
George Ryan and Rod Blagojevich (Governors); Medrano Ambrosio, Allan 
Streeter, Jesse Evans, and Virgil Jones (Alderman). See, e.g., DICK SIMPSON ET 
AL., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI. DEP’T OF POLITICAL SCI. & ILL. INTEGRITY INITIATIVE 
OF THE UNIV. OF ILL. INST. FOR GOV’T AND PUB. AFFAIRS, CHICAGO AND ILLINOIS, 
LEADING THE PACK IN CORRUPTION: ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NUMBER 5 4 
(2012), http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_politics/anti-corrup-
tion_reports/leadingthepack.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [hereinafter ANTI-CORRUPTION 
REPORT NUMBER 5]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 A recent poll found that nearly ninety percent of registered Illinois voters 
believed that political corruption by state government employees was at least 
“somewhat common.” PAUL SIMON PUB. POLICY INST. AT S. ILL. UNIV. 
CARBONDALE, THE SIMON POLL, SPRING 2014: ILLINOIS STATEWIDE 20 (2014), 
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individuals—such as myself—who grew up watching these crimi-
nals plunder the state coffers. Generally, Illinois corruption takes the 
form of bribery, extortion, conspiracy, or fraud;5 however, other 
forms of corruption such as patronage, nepotism, and clout have 
plagued Illinois throughout the years.6 The difficulty in fighting cor-
ruption is the fact that it is a by-product of Illinois’ political culture, 
and the only effective remedy that voters have is through the ballot 
box. However, the current trend of campaign finance deregulation—
along with the reality that higher campaign spending correlates to 
successful results7—ensures that the people of Illinois are doomed 
to endure the exploitation perpetuated upon them for over 150 
years.8 
Problems of political corruption in Illinois are merely an exam-
ple of larger issues nationwide. Perhaps the issues described above 
have imprinted upon voters a Hobbesian perception of human na-
ture,9 which is misplaced. However, it is difficult to deny that the 
real implications of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurispru-
dence have fostered an environment where elected officials are more 
responsive to money than they are to their constituents. The unwill-
ingness of the Court to examine the realities of the campaign finance 
landscape—in the name of First Amendment protection—calls into 
question the efficacy of the social contract10 entered into through the 
                                                                                                             
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ppi_state-
polls. Over half of all interviewed respondents believed that corruption by state 
government employees was “very common.” Id. 
 5 ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NUMBER 5, supra note 2, at 3. 
 6 UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI. DEP’T OF POLITICAL SCI., PATRONAGE, CRONYISM 
AND CRIMINALITY IN CHICAGO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: ANTI-CORRUPTION 
REPORT NUMBER 4 2 (2011), http://pols.uic.edu/docs/default-source/chicago_pol-
itics/anti-corruption_reports/anticorruptionreport_4.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 7 Domenico Montanaro et al., Money Is Pretty Good Predictor of Who Will 
Win Elections, PBS THE MORNING LINE (Nov. 11, 2014, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/money-pretty-good-predictor-will-win-
elections/. 
 8 ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NUMBER 5, supra note 2, at 2. 
 9 “I put for a generall [sic] inclination of all mankind a perpetuall [sic] and 
restlesse [sic] desire of Power after power, that ceaseth [sic] onely [sic] in Death.” 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 49 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1914). 
 10 “[T]hat a man be willing, when others are so too . . . to lay down this right 
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would 
allow other men against himselfe.” Id. at 67. 
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Constitution. Because of the significant protections for political 
spending, the right of the people to debate and elect the most quali-
fied representatives is infringed.11 When the people are not effec-
tively represented and lose interest in political participation, then the 
advantages of government disappear and the social contract is no 
longer sensible. 
This Comment will review the Court’s campaign finance juris-
prudence with a particular emphasis on the recognition of legitimate 
compelling state interests. Because a restriction on political speech 
is an infringement upon the First Amendment, the Court must find 
a compelling state interest for the restriction to be constitutional.12 
Part I provides the background of campaign finance law and how it 
evolved throughout the years. Part II includes a discussion about the 
only compelling state interest recognized by the Court, which is pre-
vention of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.13 In Part III, 
the focus will shift to the anti-distortion compelling state interest, 
which was recognized in Austin14 and subsequently overruled in Cit-
izens United.15 Part IV suggests a new way forward in the campaign 
finance jurisprudence, including a manner in which these decisions 
can be integrated. Finally, the article will conclusion and some final 
thoughts. 
I. AND QUITE SUDDENLY, WORDS BEGIN TO LOSE THEIR 
MEANING16 
The story of federal campaign finance regulation began—as all 
good stories do—in an earlier time. In the first federal attempt to 
                                                                                                             
 11 This statement is premised on the assumption that a functional democracy 
requires an intense vetting process of political candidates, and the vetting pro-
cess—campaigning—is interfered with when a miniscule percentage of the pop-
ulation can control the forum for political speech. 
 12 See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 16 This is a rather unclever adaptation of Confucius’s wise words: “When 
words lose their meaning, people lose their freedom.” See Barry Lynn, When 
Words Lose Their Meanings: The Bishops, Religious Liberty and Dubious Defi-
nitions, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (May 
2012), https://www.au.org/church-state/may-2012-church-state/perspec-
tive/when-words-lose-their-meanings. 
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limit the influence of money in campaigns, Congress passed the Till-
man Act in 1907 with the intention of preventing corporations from 
directly contributing to federal campaigns.17 This legislation re-
flected the American people’s desire to hold elections that were 
“free from the power of money.”18 Born during an age of expanding 
protections granted to corporations by the Supreme Court, Congress 
passed the Tillman Act to curb realistic fears that corporations could 
simply buy politicians to do their bidding.19 However, the Tillman 
Act alone was insufficient and, in the subsequent decades, the 
amount of money in politics increased exponentially.20 In response, 
Congress enacted three additional laws in order to fight the influence 
of money in politics.21 
In the wake of the Watergate scandals,22 Americans clamored 
for increased campaign finance regulation, and in 1974 Congress 
passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments 
                                                                                                             
 17 See Colin Cox, Comment, Protecting Free Speech After Citizens United: 
Why Overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce Violates the First 
Amendment and Encourages Corruption in Campaigns, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 339, 
343 n.24 (2013) (“The resulting 1907 statute completely banned corporate contri-
butions of ‘money . . . in connection with’ any federal election.”) (quoting 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003)). 
 18 Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Or-
chestrated the Citizens United Decision, THE NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited. 
 19 See id. Henry Clay Frick, a steel baron, once glibly described President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s shameless appeal for campaign contributions prior to Roo-
sevelt’s work in passing the Tillman Act. Frick said, “He got down on his knees 
to us. We bought the son-of-a-bitch and then he did not stay bought.” Id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 The legislation enacted was the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the 
Hatch Act of 1939, and the Taft-Hartley Act. Jonathan E. Skrabacz, Note, “Lev-
eling the Playing Field”: Reconsidering Campaign Finance Reform in the Wake 
of Arizona Free Enterprise, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 487, 490–91 (2013). 
 22 The seemingly endless number of “Whatever-gates” suggest that Wa-
tergate still impacts the American people over forty years later. This phenomena 
is unsurprising when one considers that the original scandal was “a brazen and 
daring assault, led by Nixon himself, against the heart of American democracy: 
the Constitution, our system of free elections, the rule of law.” Carl Bernstein & 
Bob Woodward, Woodward and Bernstein: 40 Years After Watergate, Nixon was 
Far Worse than We Thought, WASH. POST, June 8, 2012, http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/woodward-and-bernstein-40-years-after-watergate-nixon-
was-far-worse-than-we-thought/2012/06/08/gJQAlsi0NV_story.html. 
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were passed.23 While FECA established much of the existing regu-
latory structure of campaign finance legislation, its constitutionality 
was challenged shortly after its passage in Buckley v. Valeo.24 
Below is a detailed background of the campaign finance juris-
prudence. This jurisprudence begins with Buckley, as does much of 
the contemporary discussion regarding campaign finance. The dis-
cussion of the jurisprudence will proceed on a case-by-case basis 
because, while campaign finance is a coherent area of law, most of 
the cases considered discreet issues that are better suited for individ-
ual examination. 
A. Buckley v. Valeo Begins the Court’s Current Campaign 
Finance Jurisprudence:”If You Start Me Up, If You Start Me Up 
I’ll Never Stop”25 
In Buckley v. Valeo, a group of individual politicians challenged 
FECA on First Amendment grounds, arguing that “limiting the use 
of money for political purposes constitutes a restriction on commu-
nication violative of the First Amendment.”26 In a long and some-
what confusing opinion,27 the Court attempted to “balance an indi-
vidual’s First Amendment right to give campaign donations with the 
need to prevent corruption of elected officials.”28 Buckley provided 
the foundation for the subsequent campaign finance decisions, and 
its legacy continues to influence the Court today.29 
The FECA statute at issue in Buckley were 18 U.S.C. § 608.30 
The Court drew a distinction between contribution and expenditure 
                                                                                                             
 23 Toobin, supra note 18. 
 24 Id. (“The law imposed unprecedented limits on campaign contributions and 
spending; created the Federal Election Commission to enforce the act; established 
an optional system of public financing for Presidential elections; and required ex-
tensive disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures.”). 
 25 Generally, Buckley is the starting point for a discussion about campaign 
finance. A tribute to the Rolling Stones’ 1981 song seemed as good a way as any 
to begin this discussion. ROLLING STONES, START ME UP (Rolling Stones Rec-
ords) (1981). 
 26 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1976) (per curiam). 
 27 See Toobin, supra note 18; Cox, supra note 17, at 344. 
 28 Cox, supra note 17, at 344. 
 29 See, e.g., Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127 
HARV. L. REV. F. 373 (2014). 
 30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 nn.13–16. 
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limitations in campaign finance regulations.31 Contribution limits 
were held as a permissible restriction of First Amendment rights,32 
while the expenditure limits were struck down.33 One expenditure 
limitation that the Buckley Court rejected was 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1), 
which limited the amount of personal or family money that a candi-
date could spend on their election.34 The contribution limits were 
upheld because the Court held that it was “unnecessary to look be-
yond the Act’s primary purpose—to limit the actuality and appear-
ance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contri-
butions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justifica-
tion . . . .”35 
Perhaps one of Buckley’s most significant propositions is that 
money is a form of speech for the purposes of campaign finance 
regulations.36 If money is speech, then any type of restriction on 
campaign finance, particularly expenditure restrictions, implicates 
the First Amendment.37 The Court explained that a “restriction on 
the amount of money a person or group can spend on political com-
munication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression . . . .”38 
Also, in Buckley, the Court made clear that Congress has the 
constitutional authority to regulate federal elections—an issue that 
was not in question.39 Instead, the Court determined that the issue in 
campaign finance regulation cases is “whether the specific legisla-
tion that Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment 
freedoms or invidiously discriminates against nonincumbent candi-
dates and minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.”40 
If there is an interference with First Amendment rights, then the re-
                                                                                                             
 31 See id. at 19–21. 
 32 See id. at 29. 
 33 See id. at 45. 
 34 See id. at 51–54; id. at 54 (noting that the “ancillary interest in equalizing 
the relative financial resources of candidates . . . [was] clearly not sufficient to 
justify the provision’s infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights”). 
 35 Id. at 26. 
 36 See id. at 19–21. 
 37 See id. at 11. 
 38 Id. at 19. 
 39 Id. at 13 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4). 
 40 Id. at 14. 
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striction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est in order to pass constitutional muster.41 The only recognized 
compelling state interest was the prevention of corruption or its ap-
pearance.42 The Buckley Court ruled that even “under the rigorous 
standard of review . . . the weighty interests served by restricting the 
size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient 
to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms . . . .”43 
B. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the Court’s 
Recognition of Anti-Distortion as a Compelling State Interest: 
“Oh, You’re My Best Friend”44 
Austin was the first instance45 where the Court opined on a re-
striction of independent expenditures.46 In that case, a corporation 
challenged a Michigan law, which prevented corporations from us-
ing their general treasury funds for “independent expenditures in 
support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state 
office.”47 Under that statute, corporations were allowed to make in-
dependent expenditures to candidates for office; however, those ex-
penditures could only be made from a segregated fund, or a political 
action committee (“PAC”), used “solely for political purposes.”48 
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. at 43–45. 
 42 Id. at 26–29. 
 43 Id. at 29. The decision in Buckley ruled on the constitutionality of expendi-
ture and contribution limits. Expenditure limits were found unconstitutional in 
Buckley, and this article does not question the efficacy of that ruling. Instead, this 
article will focus primarily on the recognition of compelling state interests as they 
apply to contribution and independent expenditure limitations. 
 44 The importance of the Austin decision to the campaign finance landscape 
will be detailed further. However, because of the recognition of anti-distortion as 
a compelling state interest, an apt characterization of Austin’s relationship to cam-
paign finance could be that described in the Queen song. QUEEN, YOU’RE MY 
BEST FRIEND (Elektra) (1975). 
 45 Cox, supra note 17, at 347. 
 46 An independent expenditure is an expenditure “not made at the direction 
of, or under the control of, another person and if the expenditure is not a contri-
bution to a committee.” Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 
654–55 (1990) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.206(1) (1979)). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
2015] DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS 357 
 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan law recog-
nized—for the first time—the anti-distortion rationale as a compel-
ling state interest.49 
The anti-distortion rationale falls within the ambit of preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption because the “regulation 
aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the cor-
rosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that 
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas.”50 This compelling state interest “does not attempt 
‘to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections,’ . . . ra-
ther, it ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for po-
litical ideas espoused by corporations.”51 
While it may seem that this type of compelling state interest is 
penalizing corporations for amassing large amounts of money, it is 
not. The anti-distortion rationale is simply an attempt to prevent cor-
porations from dominating the forum for political speech with the 
assistance of wealth partially attained through state-conferred bene-
fits.52 Corporations are granted special benefits by state laws, in-
cluding “limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of 
the accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance their abil-
ity to attract capital . . . .”53 Because of these advantages, corpora-
tions were not allowed to use their general treasury funds to influ-
ence the outcome of a candidate election.54 Instead, under the Mich-
igan statute, corporations were allowed to make independent ex-
penditures through separate segregated funds.55 The distinction 
drawn by the Court was that contributions to segregated funds were 
made with an understanding that the money would “be used solely 
for political purposes, [so] the speech generated accurately reflects 
contributors’ support for the corporation’s political views.”56 
                                                                                                             
 49 See id. at 658–62. 
 50 Id. at 659–60. 
 51 Id. at 658–62 (citations omitted). 
 52 See id. at 660. 
 53 Id. at 658–59. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at 660–62. 
 56 Id. at 660–61. 
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C. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti Otherwise Known as the 
First Case Regarding a Taxable Entity: “And the Court Keeps 
Runnin’, Runnin’”57 
In First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, the Court heard a chal-
lenge to a statute which prevented any corporation from making 
contributions or expenditures for referendum issues unrelated to that 
corporation’s “property, business or assets . . . .”58 While finding 
that the statute was unconstitutional, the Court held that the First 
Amendment does not allow the government to restrict speech based 
on the corporate identity of a speaker.59 The Court was particularly 
disturbed by the statute in question60 because, in effect, it enabled 
the state to “regulate the subjects about which persons may speak 
and speakers who may address an issue of public concern.”61 Alt-
hough this case ostensibly stands for the proposition that the state 
cannot differentiate between speakers based on identity—which 
Bellotti stated62—one consequential portion of Bellotti was a limit-
ing footnote from the opinion. Footnote 26 stated, “Congress might 
well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or ap-
parent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to in-
fluence candidate elections.”63 
                                                                                                             
 57 The Court’s movement onward without overturning any campaign finance 
precedent, regardless of the different restrictions or entities concerned, may have 
been the inspiration for the Black Eyed Peas song. BLACK EYED PEAS, LET’S GET 
IT STARTED (Interscope) (2004). 
 58 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978). 
 59 See id. at 784. 
 60 See id. at 784–85. 
 61 Cox, supra note 17, at 346. 
 62 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. 
 63 Id. at 788 n.26 (emphasis added). 
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D. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n and the Short-Lived 
Implications for Campaign Finance: “Like a Sunset Dying with the 
Rising of the Moon, Gone too Soon”64 
After the turn of the century, Congress attempted to strengthen 
campaign finance laws by closing existing “loopholes.”65 Most sig-
nificantly, Congress sought to curb the explosion of soft money and 
electioneering communications, which followed the Buckley deci-
sion, by passing the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 
2002 (“BCRA”).66 BCRA was later challenged in McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n.67 
The McConnell Court considered Title I of BCRA, which re-
stricted soft money.68 Soft money was unrestricted before BCRA 
and “permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals who 
had already made the maximum permissible contributions to federal 
candidates, to contribute ‘nonfederal money’—also known as ‘soft 
money’—to political parties for activities intended to influence state 
or local elections.”69 Also, the Court examined electioneering com-
munications,70 which were permitted because Buckley held that 
FECA should only be interpreted to include “election-related activ-
ity containing ‘express advocacy[]’ . . . .”71 Express advocacy is lim-
ited to television or radio ads that specifically say to vote for or 
against an individual.72 Whereas electioneering communications are 
broadcasts, which are aired within a specific period of time before 
an election and target at least 50,000 individuals, that clearly iden-
tify a candidate for federal office.73 The Court held that the state 
                                                                                                             
 64 Although the McConnell decision could not have motivated the 1993 song 
by Michael Jackson, its short-lived life certainly fits the song. MICHAEL JACKSON, 
GONE TOO SOON (Epic Records) (1993). 
 65 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581, 588–89 (2011). 
 66 See, e.g., id.; Cox, supra note 17, at 349. 
 67 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 68 Id. at 132. 
 69 See id. at 123. 
 70 Id. at 189–90. 
 71 See Hasen, supra note 65, at 589. 
 72 See, e.g., id. 
 73 Electioneering communications are those that meet the criteria and do not 
expressly say to vote for or against a candidate. See McConnell, 549 U.S. at 194. 
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interest was compelling74 and reaffirmed Austin.75 However, in their 
separate opinions, Justices Thomas and Kennedy planted the seeds 
for what would become the Citizens United decision.76 
The McConnell decision had significant implications on the 
campaign finance jurisprudence because it “set forth a democratic 
framework and a public participation agenda which addressed the 
threat arising from corruption and the appearance of corruption.”77 
The underlying justification for the McConnell decision’s impact 
was that Congress had authority to oversee the campaign finance 
landscape and “to legislate in this area to curtail abuses and thereby 
protect the integrity of the democratic system.”78 Although the ma-
jority decision in Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL II”) would later 
reject this democratic integrity framework,79 the McConnell major-
ity and the WRTL II dissent fiercely defended the framework and the 
role that Congress plays in regulating campaign finance.80 The es-
sence of the democratic integrity framework is to “identif[y] the ac-
tivity as financing political speech and the issue as enhancing public 
participation and government responsiveness by preventing corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption.”81 Whereas the political speech 
framework, which was set forth in WRTL II, “defines the activity as 
political speech and the issue as burdening, banning or prohibiting 
political speech.”82 
One important inconsistency, which the Court had yet to decide 
definitively, was whether the state could restrict speech based on a 
speaker’s identity.83 Before Austin, the Court “forbade restrictions 
on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity . . . .”84 
                                                                                                             
 74 See Cox, supra note 17, at 350. 
 75 Hasen, supra note 65, at 589. 
 76 See Cox, supra note 17, at 351–52. 
 77 Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the Balance of Powers: A 
New Framework for Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin Right to 
Life, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV., 267, 269 (2008) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. 
at 205). 
 78 Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115–22). 
 79 Id.; FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2686 (2007). 
 80 See Hill, supra note 77, at 269. 
 81 Id. at 272. 
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 83 See id. at 353. 
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However, after the Austin decision, the Court appeared to allow such 
distinctions.85 
E. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n and the Court’s 
Somewhat Surprising Decision to Overturn Decades-Long 
Precedent: “To Everything: Turn, Turn, Turn”86 
Between the decisions in Buckley and Citizens United, the 
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence “swung like a pendulum to-
ward and away from deference[]” for the compelling state inter-
ests.87 However, it was not until Citizens United that the Court was 
prepared to overturn any of its campaign finance precedent.88 
Citizens United89 marked a distinct shift in the Court’s campaign 
finance jurisprudence.90 This decision was polarizing, and many 
Americans had an opinion about the consequences of the case.91 The 
holding overturned Austin and partly overruled McConnell.92 Much 
of the uproar among Americans focused on the implications that this 
decision had on corporate campaign spending;93 however, the more 
far-reaching consequence of the decision was the narrowing of the 
definition of corruption—the only accepted compelling state inter-
est—to the “risk of quid pro quo transactions involving campaign 
contributions directly to candidates for office.”94 “[T]he immediate 
                                                                                                             
 85 See id. 
 86 Such a marked change like Citizens United brings to mind the classic song 
by The Byrds. THE BYRDS, TURN! TURN! TURN! (Colombia Records) (1965). 
 87 Hasen, supra note 65, at 586. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 90 Although his comments were applied in a different context, almost cer-
tainly Justice Breyer would agree that his words apply to Citizens United: “It is 
not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much.” Linda Green-
house, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/washington/01scotus.html?page-
wanted=all. 
 91 This decision was so divisive that protests about the decision were held at 
courthouses around the United States, including on the steps of the Supreme 
Court, to mark Citizens United’s second anniversary. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Cit-
izens United v. FEC Decision Proves Justice is Blind—Politically, POLITICO (Jan. 
25, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71961.html. 
 92 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. 
 93 Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 
14 (2012). 
 94 Id. at 3–4. 
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and dramatic policy consequence of Citizens United was that federal 
prohibitions on corporate sponsorship of campaign speech in the 
form of electioneering communications and independent expendi-
tures, as well as similar prohibitions modeled after federal law in 
roughly half the states, were suddenly unconstitutional.”95 As the 
Court reversed the decades-long expansion of its definition of cor-
ruption,96 the Court also rejected Austin and part of the McConnell 
decision, both of which rested upon the anti-distortion rationale.97 
The federal law at issue in Citizens United was BCRA, which 
“prohibited corporations and unions from using their general trea-
sury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as 
an ‘electioneering communication.’”98 The Court characterized this 
prohibition as “a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact 
that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak.”99 PACs are 
separate organizations established for the purpose of raising and 
spending money in candidate elections.100 The Court explained its 
statement by saying that “the PAC exemption . . . does not allow 
corporations to speak” because “PACs are burdensome alternatives; 
they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regula-
tions.”101 Granted, there are additional requirements placed on a 
PAC in reporting and administering the organization; however, 
                                                                                                             
 95 See id. at 11. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319. 
 98 Cox, supra note 17, at 354 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–21); 
see also 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012). 
 99 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337. 
 100 PACs are different than Super PACs. Super PACs wonly make independ-
ent expenditures in federal elections rather than contributions to candidates or par-
ties. See What is a PAC?, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opense-
crets.org/pacs/pacfaq.php (last visited July 26, 2015). 
 101 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337. The problem with this explanation is that 
it is wrong. If PACs were overly burdensome, then a second-year law student 
would have trouble determining how to form a PAC. However, one second-year 
law student—who is not particularly intelligent—found the requisite form for es-
tablishing a PAC in one Google search, while sitting on his couch watching a 
college football game. Had he intended to create a PAC, he could have done so 
by filling out the form in an additional fifteen to twenty minutes, which is enough 
time to watch two sustained scoring drives and a set of commercials. Surely, the 
argument that creating a PAC is burdensome cannot be sustained. 
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these are hardly burdensome enough to justify the Court’s hold-
ing.102 Also, the majority in Citizens United defined corruption very 
narrowly.103 The Court said that the compelling state interest of pre-
venting corruption and its appearance, set forth in Buckley, was 
“limited to quid pro quo corruption.”104 
The Citizens United Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements of BCRA; the Court explained that these requirements 
burden speech, but “impose no ceiling on campaign-related activi-
ties . . . .”105 Further, the disclaimer and disclosure requirements sat-
isfy a “governmental interest in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with in-
formation’ about the sources of election-related spending.”106 
In a spirited dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the majority’s 
characterization that BCRA banned corporate speech.107 Stevens 
made clear that the PAC requirement is not a ban on corporate 
speech, but rather a regulation that provides corporations with “a 
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advo-
cacy.”108 Also, while acknowledging that there is some administra-
tive burden on corporations that establish PACs, Justice Stevens rec-
ognized that the burden is not severe and is similar to the disclaimer 
and disclosure requirements, which the Court upheld.109 
The dissent also disputed the majority’s insistence that identity-
based restrictions are not permitted by the First Amendment.110 In 
fact, “[t]he Government routinely places special restrictions on the 
                                                                                                             
 102 The FEC provides guides and forms on its website and none of these doc-
uments require a juris doctor to interpret them. Additionally, many of these re-
quirements—such as recording disbursements of funds, maintaining a record of a 
donor’s name, address, date, and amount of contribution, and quarterly or semi-
annual filing depending on whether it is an election year—would likely already 
be satisfied because most corporations employ some type of bookkeeping system. 
See Quick Answers to PAC Questions, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml (last visited July 26, 2015). 
 103 See Hasen, supra note 65, at 596 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359). 
 104 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
 105 Id. at 366 (citation omitted). 
 106 Id. at 367 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 107 See id. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. at 416. 
 110 See id. at 420. 
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speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, 
foreigners, and its own employees.”111 
Finally, the dissent addressed the compelling state interests at 
issue in Citizens United. Stevens rejected the narrow definition of 
corruption applied by the majority because “the difference between 
selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.”112 
The dissent defended the anti-distortion rationale.113 Although “Aus-
tin can bear an egalitarian reading,”114 Justice Stevens rejected the 
majority’s claim that it is “an ‘equalizing’ ideal in disguise.”115 In-
stead, the dissent contended that the anti-distortion rationale is 
“simply a variant on the classic governmental interest in protecting 
against improper influences on officeholders that debilitate the dem-
ocratic process.”116 
F. The Progeny of Citizens United: “Yesterday, All My Troubles 
Seemed So Far Away”117 
The rationale underlying the Citizens United decision has been 
applied to campaign finance cases since the ruling. One such case 
was McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, which challenged ag-
gregate contribution limits.118 The statute at issue in McCutcheon 
provided two separate sets of limits on individual contributions to 
candidates or committees.119 The first was base limits, which “re-
strict[] how much money a donor may contribute to a particular can-
didate or committee.”120 The second—which was at issue in this 
case—were aggregate limits that “restrict[] how much money a do-
nor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees.”121 The 
                                                                                                             
 111 Id. (citations omitted). 
 112 Id. at 447. 
 113 See Hasen, supra note 65, at 602. 
 114 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 464 n.69. 
 115 Id. at 464 (citation omitted). 
 116 Id. 
 117 The Beatles wrote these words in their 1965 song. One cannot help but 
notice the application of these lyrics to the campaign finance jurisprudence fol-
lowing Citizens United, especially because the quartet’s ballad continued with 
“Now it looks as though they’re here to stay, Oh, I believe in yesterday.” THE 
BEATLES, YESTERDAY (Capitol Records) (1965). 
 118 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014). 
 119 See id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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base limits were not challenged because the Court “previously up-
held [them] as serving the permissible objective of combatting cor-
ruption.”122 The rationale behind the aggregate limits was to prevent 
circumvention of the base limits; however, the Court rejected this 
because the aggregate limits “do little, if anything” to prevent cor-
ruption and held the aggregate limits a violation of the First Amend-
ment.123 
Before rejecting the aggregate limits, the Court identified the 
purported state interest to determine if it was compelling.124 The 
McCutcheon plurality defines corruption narrowly as limited to quid 
pro quo corruption or its appearance.125 The plurality cites Buckley, 
along with Citizens United,126as standing for this proposition127 even 
though, in reality, Buckley did not define corruption.128 Because the 
Court applied the narrow definition of corruption, the government 
needed to prove that the aggregate limits were narrowly tailored to 
prevent circumvention of the base limits. Aggregate limits had been 
accepted since Buckley, when the Court identified them as “no more 
than a corollary” of base limits.129 
The Court identified the necessity of aggregate limits in Buckley 
because they prevented a person from “contribut[ing] massive 
amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of un-
earmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute 
to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political 
party.”130 However, the McCutcheon Court rejected the idea that the 
aggregate limits prevented circumvention and dismissed the hypo-
thetical circumvention measures of the dissent131 as impossible 
given the current statutory regime.132 
                                                                                                             
 122 See id. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. at 1450. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1451. 
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 128 See Elias & Berkon, supra note 29, at 375. 
 129 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (per curiam). 
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 131 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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After Citizens United, the narrow definition of corruption has 
opened the door for challenges to the few remaining campaign fi-
nance measures.133 This state of campaign finance jurisprudence 
leaves Americans with only one relatively rare protection of catch-
ing a politician or contributor with their hand in the proverbial 
cookie jar. 
II. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION: “ONE IS THE LONELIEST NUMBER 
THAT YOU’LL EVER DO”134 
Since Buckley, the only compelling state interest accepted by the 
Court regarding campaign finance regulations has been preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.135 Over the years, under 
the Rehnquist Court,136 the definition expanded to permit a wider 
range of regulations, including contribution limits,137 restrictions on 
corporate and union spending,138 prohibitions on soft money,139 and 
anti-distortion.140 This definition was turned on its head by the Citi-
zens United decision, which greatly narrowed the expanded defini-
tion.141 
The Citizens United decision limited corruption as a compelling 
state interest only to quid pro quo corruption.142 In support of this 
definition, Justice Kennedy—author of the Citizens United majority 
opinion—cited his own dissent in McConnell.143 Justice Kennedy 
wrote that elected officials who are under the influence of or provid-
ing access to certain speakers have not committed corruption.144 He 
further explained, “[f]avoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable 
                                                                                                             
 133 See Kang, supra note 93, at 3–4. 
 134 As the only recognized compelling state interest, the anti-corruption inter-
est must understand how Three Dog Night felt in their 1968 song. THREE DOG 
NIGHT, ONE (MCA Records) (1968). 
 135 Kang, supra note 93, at 3. 
 136 See id. at 4. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See id. 
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 140 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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 142 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357–60 
(2010). 
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in representative politics.”145 The Court’s narrowing of the defini-
tion of corruption has put the efficacy of campaign finance regula-
tions in jeopardy. 
III. ANTI-DISTORTION: “TWO CAN BE AS BAD AS ONE, IT’S THE 
LONELIEST NUMBER SINCE THE NUMBER ONE”146 
The anti-distortion interest was recognized as a compelling state 
interest in Austin and later rejected in Citizens United.147 As dis-
cussed above, the only recognized compelling state interest in the 
post-Citizens United campaign finance landscape is quid pro quo 
corruption or the appearance of such corruption. 
A. Which Way Does Buckley Actually Cut? 
The anti-distortion interest has been assailed by the Court re-
cently as a concept that has long been rejected by the First Amend-
ment.148 The Citizens United149 and McCutcheon150 opinions quoted 
Buckley as standing for this rejection proposition. It is true that the 
Court in Buckley spoke critically of “equalizing the relative ability 
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elec-
tions . . . .”151 The Court said “the concept that government may 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to en-
hance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment . . . .”152 
However, the Citizens United and McCutcheon decisions cru-
cially fail to mention that this statement about equalizing speech was 
made during Buckley’s discussion of expenditures.153 This discus-
sion about the lack of an interest was not discussed in the section of 
                                                                                                             
 145 Id. (citation omitted). 
 146 The anti-distortion interest was only recognized for a short time until the 
Citizens United decision and, along with anti-corruption, these interests stood 
alone in protecting the legitimacy of elections. See supra note 134 and accompa-
nying text. 
 147 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 148 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam). 
 149 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 150 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 151 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48. 
 152 Id. at 48–49. 
 153 See id. 
368 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:348 
 
the Buckley decision dedicated to contribution limits.154 In fact, the 
Court easily accepted the contribution limits as a constitutionally 
permissible restriction of the First Amendment.155 Further, the Court 
explained that this equalizing interest is unconstitutional because the 
First Amendment was designed “to secure the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources, 
and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about 
of political and social changes desired by the people.”156 The anti-
distortion interest is not at odds with the purpose of the First Amend-
ment. In fact, it encourages a wider variety of speech by preventing 
a small number of entities or individuals from dominating the forum 
for speech. 
B. An Argument for Anti-Distortion 
In the interest of transparency—although it may already be 
clear—this author supports the recognition of anti-distortion as a 
compelling state interest. Also, in the interest of further transpar-
ency, the difficulties in recognizing this interest are readily apparent. 
Since the decision in Buckley, the Court has been clear that infringe-
ments on a person’s First Amendment rights in order to equalize the 
ability of another to speak are “wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment . . . .”157 Thus, the first element to consider is whether there is 
a difference between anti-distortion and equalizing the ability to 
speak.158 Next, there is legitimate debate regarding whether or not 
the anti-distortion rationale is truly an interest proceeding from the 
anti-corruption state interest.159 Finally, there are issues relating to 
the different treatment of corporations and individuals.160 Admit-
tedly, these are hard distinctions to draw. Perhaps that is the reason 
                                                                                                             
 154 See id. 
 155 Id. at 29. 
 156 Id. at 49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 
(1964)). 
 157 Id. at 48–49. 
 158 Equalizing the ability of speakers is also referred to as leveling the playing 
field, so these terms will be used interchangeably. See, e.g., Skrabacz, supra note 
21, at 487–88. 
 159 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion 
Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 997 (2011). 
 160 See id. 
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the government essentially abandoned its defense of the anti-distor-
tion interest during oral argument in Citizens United.161 However, 
regardless of this difficulty, distinctions do exist and this article will 
attempt to draw them below.162 
1. IS ANTI-DISTORTION ACTUALLY LEVELING THE PLAYING     
FIELD? 
Although equalizing speech and anti-distortion ostensibly ap-
pear to be different concepts, the lines blur when one begins to think 
about these distinctions. The majority in Citizens United seemed to 
think that the anti-distortion rationale is simply a disguised ver-
sion163 of the equalizing interest rejected in Buckley.164 However, 
the dissent defends anti-distortion as “simply a variant on the classic 
governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on 
officeholders . . . .”165 With these two different viewpoints, it ap-
pears to be a matter of interpretation as to what Austin really means 
by “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form . . . .”166 
Because the equalizing interest was rejected in Buckley,167 any 
attempt to expand the definition of corruption had to avoid any im-
plication of an attempt to equalize the ability to speak. The Austin 
Court was careful to avoid any implications that the anti-distortion 
interest “rel[ied] on a speech-equalization rationale . . . .”168 How-
ever, following the Citizens United decision, the Court refused to 
accept the anti-distortion rationale because it “ban[s] political 
speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken 
                                                                                                             
 161 See, e.g., id. at 992–96. 
 162 Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United attempted and failed to coher-
ently defend the anti-distortion rationale. This section in some ways attempts to 
succeed where he failed; however, this author is under no illusions that his legal 
analysis can surpass that of the brilliant former Justice. 
 163 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010). 
 164 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam). 
 165 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 166 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 167 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 168 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 464 n.69. 
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on the corporate form.”169 Regardless of the fact that corporations 
could still speak through PACs,170 the Court reiterated that the gov-
ernment does not have an interest in “equalizing the relative ability 
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.”171 
One definition of “distort” is “twist[ing] out of the true meaning 
or proportion.”172 So, for the purposes of campaign finance, anti-
distortion effectively means to bring things into proportion. The def-
inition of “equalize” is “to make equal” or “to compensate for.”173 
Thus, by definition, by putting two things into proportion, someone 
is equalizing those things to some extent. 
Leaving aside the similarities between anti-distortion and equal-
izing, there are important differences between the two. Most nota-
bly, the anti-distortion interest is not attempting to make the voices 
of speakers equal.174 Rather, in Austin, the anti-distortion interest 
was said to prevent corporations from dominating the forum for po-
litical speech with the assistance of the benefits that those corpora-
tions receive through the corporate form.175 Anti-distortion falls in 
line with the democratic integrity framework laid down in 
McConnell, which was grounded in the idea that campaign finance 
regulation was necessary for the integrity of both elections and the 
public policy process.176 The integrity framework targets campaign 
finance laws on those selling or buying votes and influence; how-
ever, the objective of the framework is to “ensure opportunities for 
participation by ordinary individuals, including the right of individ-
uals to form organizations to amplify their voices in public policy 
debates and in election campaigns.”177 Anti-distortion is simply a 
prevention measure, not an equalization measure.178 It does not sug-
gest that any certain number of people need to speak at the same 
                                                                                                             
 169 Id. at 349. 
 170 See id. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 171 Id. at 350 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 172 Distort, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/distort (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
 173 Equalize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-web-
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 174 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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volume; instead, the anti-distortion rationale prevents one person or 
group from shouting so loud that nobody else can be heard. 
Also, the anti-distortion rationale—as held in Austin—is limited 
to corporations, and therefore has no effect on actual speakers.179 
There is no risk of the government attempting to equalize the ability 
of individuals to speak.180 This state interest is strictly limited to ar-
tificial entities that can distort the political discourse for their own 
gain.181 Corporations are created for the purpose of making 
money.182 A corporation’s management would be acting ultra vires 
if political spending was not conducted in furtherance of making 
profits.183 While individual Americans will generally—and unfortu-
nately—vote with their pocketbooks,184 an individual has the ability 
to vote for social issues or the good of the nation if he or she 
pleases,185 whereas a corporation cannot. In effect, the anti-distor-
tion interest is merely a preventative measure against artificial per-
sons serving their own interests to the detriment of society as a 
whole. 
Finally, although equalizing may not be in line with the purpose 
of the First Amendment, anti-distortion fulfills its intent. One of the 
reasons that the freedom of speech clause was included in the First 
Amendment was “to foster democratic self-government . . . .”186 In 
Buckley, the Court recognized a “societal aspect of the First Amend-
ment by prescribing an ‘electorate-centered’ analytical approach 
                                                                                                             
 179 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[C]orporations are not 
actually members of [society].”). 
 180 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658–62. 
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 182 See id. 
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 186 Roya Rahmanpour, Comment, Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett: Money Talks, Matching Funds Provision Walks, 45 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 657, 670 (2012). 
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whereby ‘the relationship between First Amendment rights and 
campaign finance should be structured in a way that best serves the 
electorate.’”187 By rejecting this traditional society-centered ap-
proach, the Court “prioritized individual speech over societal inter-
ests.”188 While critics note the difficulty for a court to draw the line 
between societal interests and individual speech,189 consideration of 
the “countervailing societal interests in a First Amendment analysis” 
is essential.190 
The rights of every individual to speak should be respected, as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.191 However, the legal fiction 
that money equals speech should not preclude the Court from con-
sidering the harm that deregulation of campaign finance may have 
on society as a whole. 
The First Amendment was put in place to allow and encourage 
individuals to speak their minds.192 In order to further protect the 
First Amendment, the anti-distortion rationale was recognized by 
the Court to ensure that certain favored persons did not dominate the 
forum for speech.193 Although this rationale has been rejected in re-
cent years, it cannot be rejected as an equalizing principle because 
the two are actually quite different.194 
2. IS THE ANTI-DISTORTION INTEREST A COMPONENT OF THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION INTEREST? 
Because the only legitimate compelling state interest can be the 
prevention of corruption or its appearance,195 the Court needed to fit 
the anti-distortion rationale into the anti-corruption interest.196 In 
                                                                                                             
 187 Id. (citations omitted). 
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 189 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349–50 
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Citizens United, the Court rejected the anti-distortion rationale as an 
impermissible corollary to the anti-corruption interest.197 The Court 
maintained that the anti-distortion interest was really an equalization 
rationale in disguise.198 However, the Citizens United dissent main-
tained that the “antidistortion rationale is itself an anticorruption ra-
tionale, tied to the special concerns raised by corporations.”199 A 
firm decision on this issue would go a long way in determining the 
validity of the anti-distortion interest. 
The debate surrounding the acceptance of the anti-distortion ra-
tionale as an anti-corruption interest has grown since the decision in 
Austin.200 This is partly because the Buckley Court gave no firm def-
inition of corruption.201 This section will include a brief discussion 
of Justice Stevens’s defense of the anti-distortion interest in Citizens 
United, the reasons why anti-distortion is not part of the anti-corrup-
tion interest, and why that should not matter. 
In his Citizens United dissent, Justice Stevens attempted to make 
the anti-distortion and anti-corruption interests coherent; however, 
he was unable to do so.202 From the beginning of the dissent, he de-
nied that there is any difference between anti-corruption and anti-
distortion—as applied to corporate spending—because both are 
based on preventing improper influence on public officials.203 Then, 
Justice Stevens began to make arguments that are unrelated to quid 
pro quo corruption or undue influence, which suggests that “his 
equation of anticorruption and antidistortion was incorrect . . . .”204 
Justice Stevens’s dissent went on to argue “that corporations deserve 
less First Amendment protection than humans, that corporate spend-
ing can ‘drown out’ the voices of non-corporate interests, that cor-
porate spending can undermine voter confidence in our democracy, 
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and that corporations can act in ways that undermine the efficiency 
of government.”205 Upon closer inspection, only one of these argu-
ments—the second—has anything to do with the anti-distortion in-
terest; also, only the third argument even begins to implicate the 
anti-corruption interest. 
Justice Stevens, along with other justices and legal commenta-
tors,206 has struggled to fit the anti-distortion rationale within the 
anti-corruption interest. As evidenced above, it is difficult to make 
these two rationales, which the Austin Court held to be intertwined, 
cohere. 
The Austin Court maintained that the anti-distortion interest 
“aim[ed] at a different type of corruption in the political arena” than 
anti-corruption.207 According to Austin, anti-distortion was con-
cerned with the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggre-
gations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for 
the corporation’s political ideas.”208 The Court was most concerned 
with political speech “reflect[ing] actual public support for the po-
litical ideas espoused . . . .”209 
The problem with reconciling the anti-distortion rationale and 
the anti-corruption interest is the initial characterization of anti-dis-
tortion in Austin. After parsing the language of the opinion, the anti-
distortion rationale is not a component of the anti-corruption inter-
est; rather, anti-distortion is a separate, freestanding interest.210 Re-
gardless of the explanation or support that a proponent of the anti-
distortion interest may provide, it is truly a stretch of the imagination 
to argue that anti-distortion is simply an anti-corruption measure. 
Distortion of political discourse does not present the danger of cor-
rupting public officials, at least not to the extent that justifies in-
fringement on the First Amendment. Therefore, this article comes to 
the same conclusion as the Citizens United and McCutcheon Courts: 
anti-distortion is not a legitimate component of the anti-corruption 
compelling state interest. 
                                                                                                             
 205 Id. 
 206 See, e.g., Kang, supra note 93, at 21–22. 
 207 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
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However, should any of the discussion included in this section 
actually matter? In short, no. Regardless of all the paragraphs above, 
all the opinions and dissents, and all of the law review articles, none 
of this discussion about whether anti-distortion is a legitimate ra-
tionale for the anti-corruption interest should matter. Because after 
thinking through the issues surrounding campaign finance, it is ap-
parent that there is more than one compelling interest that a state has 
in its elections.211 
The current compelling state interest definition is limited solely 
to preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, which com-
pletely neglects access and undue influence on public officials.212 
But does the state have any other interest in elections? Is a state’s 
desire to have widespread voter participation and engagement inap-
propriate? Can a state attempt to foster an environment where a 
broader percentage of the population can be heard without receiving 
the title “Big Brother”? These are legitimate questions to ask when 
the future of the American Republic rests upon elections, which are 
protected by a single interest recognized nearly forty years ago in 
Buckley.213 
States have many interests in their elections, and the prevention 
of public-official corruption—along with its appearance—is but a 
single interest.214 Anti-distortion is another. Anti-distortion is an in-
terest for the reasons discussed by the Austin Court,215 but not be-
cause this interest prevents corruption. This interest is compelling 
because it fulfills the purpose of the First Amendment, which is to 
encourage and allow a wide variety of people to speak.216 The anti-
distortion interest achieves this goal by requiring corporations to go 
through the proper channels in order to speak.217 Those channels, 
i.e., establishing a PAC,218 do not even require the state to decide 
whether or not the speech can be heard. A corporation can speak as 
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freely as it would like, so long as the money that it is using to fund 
the speech is obtained for the purpose of speaking.219 
The campaign finance landscape has changed dramatically over 
the years,220 and the laws regulating this arena need to change as 
well. Perhaps Justice Holmes said it best in the first expression of a 
living constitution221 when he wrote: 
When we are dealing with words that also are a con-
stituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, 
we must realize that they have called into life a being 
the development of which could not have been fore-
seen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It 
was enough for them to realize or to hope that they 
had created an organism; it has taken a century and 
has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation.222 
The meaning of the First Amendment, like the rest of the Con-
stitution, has changed over the centuries. While there may have been 
no anti-distortion compelling state interest in 1915, one hundred 
years later, America is a different place. Many corporations hold 
vast assets, which—if unchecked—could control the outcome of 
elections.223 The anti-distortion interest is a partial recognition of the 
change in the American landscape and an attempt to protect the au-
thenticity of the electoral process. The anti-distortion interest is not 
a corollary to the anti-corruption interest.224 It is simply another in-
terest that the state legitimately has in its political discourse. 
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3. SHOULD CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS BE TREATED 
DIFFERENTLY? 
Because of the structure of the legal system in the United States 
and the comprehensive nature of campaign finance jurisprudence, 
the rationale for one decision could have a major outcome on a 
seemingly unrelated matter. For instance, the narrow definition of 
corruption set forth in Citizens United helped craft the decision in 
McCutcheon.225 Therefore, the rationale for restricting the speech of 
a corporation could be applied to a different situation: limiting an 
individual’s political speech. This section will first discuss the easier 
issue of how the anti-distortion interest applies to corporations. 
Then, this section will examine the more difficult matter of how this 
could apply to individuals. 
The majority in Citizens United was particularly concerned with 
chilling the speech of a corporation based solely on the speaker’s 
identity.226 The Court worried that individuals could make extensive 
independent expenditures while “certain disfavored associations of 
citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are penal-
ized for engaging in the same political speech.”227 Here, the Court 
failed to recognize that campaign finance regulations on corpora-
tions are not restrictions on the individuals who comprise those cor-
porations.228 Every employee of a corporation, from the CEO to the 
janitor, could individually speak with no restrictions. Further, the 
corporation itself could speak, so long as its speech was voiced at a 
reasonable volume and through PACs.229 The only restrictions that 
campaign finance regulations impose are on the corporate person. 
The idea that a corporation is a person is a legal fiction.230 Instead 
                                                                                                             
 225 Citizens United was a case regarding corporate independent expenditures, 
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of blindly protecting the rights of artificial entities, the Court should 
focus on protecting the First Amendment rights of individuals as the 
Amendment originally intended. 
Also, the Citizens United dissent suggests that “large corporate 
spending could ‘marginalize[]’ the opinions of ‘real people’ by 
‘drowning out . . . non-corporate voices.’”231 Another problem with 
the distortion of permitting unfettered corporate speech is that it 
“‘can generate the impression that corporations dominate our de-
mocracy’ and give corporations ‘special advantages in the market 
for legislation.’”232 Admittedly, support for the anti-distortion ra-
tionale is more difficult to make when realizing that it could be ap-
plied to individuals as well. This difficulty could be avoided com-
pletely if, upon recognizing anti-distortion as a compelling state in-
terest, the Court explicitly stated that it did not apply to actual peo-
ple. However, it may not be altogether unwise to apply the anti-dis-
tortion interest to individuals as well. 
The First Amendment is perhaps the most sacred sentence233 
recorded in American history because of the governmental tyranny 
it stands against.234 The Citizens United Court recognized this and 
said, “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power, the First 
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or 
viewpoints. . . . Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing 
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not oth-
ers.”235 This article will not attempt, nor would its author ever sug-
gest, that these words do not ring true for pure speech; however, 
when considering the legal fiction that individuals are as free to fill 
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politicians’ pockets as they are to speak their thoughts, a divergence 
of opinion occurs. It must be constantly reiterated that campaign fi-
nance regulations concern currency and not the ability of an individ-
ual to speak his or her mind.236 For example, regulations on cam-
paign finance do not prevent an individual from speaking in support 
of or opposition to a candidate at a social gathering, political rally, 
or even in a publication. These regulations are solely concerned with 
the amount of money that the individual may dole out to support that 
candidate or any other. 
A democracy cannot effectively function when the chain of 
communication between the people and their elected representatives 
is broken.237 The Court’s recent jurisprudence on campaign finance 
has obliterated that chain of communication by allowing a small 
number of wealthy individuals and groups to hijack the forum for 
speech.238 For example, Sheldon Adelson—a name familiar to ob-
servers of campaign finance and the Forbes list of the 400 Richest 
Americans—contributed nearly $100 million during the 2012 elec-
tion cycle.239 In advance of the 2016 Presidential Election, at least 
four presidential hopefuls beseeched Adelson for contributions in 
what political commentators have dubbed the “Sheldon Primary.”240 
Further, in Florida’s recent unsuccessful referendum issue regarding 
medical marijuana legalization, Adelson contributed eighty-five 
percent of the funding to the leading anti-legalization organiza-
tion.241 These facts are not intended to single out Mr. Adelson or 
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 237 “Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard.” 
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imply that his opinion is any less important than another Ameri-
can’s; however, these points illustrate that our political process has 
been subverted by a small percentage of the electorate. 
Why should presidential candidates fawn over an individual do-
nor? Why should a referendum issue in Florida be so heavily influ-
enced by a single person in Nevada? In the face of such a bleak re-
ality, the Court’s position that it is simply protecting First Amend-
ment rights loses credence. The rationale behind the anti-distortion 
interest is that no single individual should dominate the forum for 
political speech.242 Not every American’s voice will ever be equal 
or relatively equal, and perhaps that is not an inherent harm. But, at 
the same time, a few individuals should not be allowed to control 
the American political discourse solely because they have money.243 
Justice Scalia would likely rebut these arguments with his simple 
phrase, “the more speech, the better.”244 However, that would only 
be true if the forum for political speech were infinite; in reality, the 
forum for speech is finite and limited to the weeks and months be-
fore an election.245 Further, an increase in the amount of speech is 
only beneficial if that speech comes from different sources and 
viewpoints.246 
Finally, an individual does not need money to speak. None of 
this discussion has anything to do with pure speech or speech that 
does not involve the spending of money.247 There are alternate forms 
of political speech that do not require campaign contributions or in-
dependent expenditures. One such obvious example is pure speech 
in a public forum, which is reminiscent of the United States Revo-
lutionary Period, but there are others. For example, social media 
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does not require money and, in today’s interconnected society, it is 
effective for political speech.248 While the likes of Kim Kardashian 
may pay private firms in an attempt to break the internet, a vast ma-
jority of social media users may express their opinions free of charge 
to influence massive social dialogue and change. 
In order to ensure that the purpose of the First Amendment is 
realized—”to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources[]’”249—perhaps it is 
necessary to curtail the spending of a few wealthy individuals. 
IV. A “NEW” WAY FORWARD 
Like most other quasi-geeky law students, an appreciation of le-
gal history and the evolution of law is not lost on the author of this 
Comment. Further, this article does not suggest that stare decisis250 
should be abandoned. However, the reality is that Americans live in 
a brave new world,251 where devices carried in one’s pocket have 
more computing power than the computers that landed astronauts on 
the moon.252 Elections have also changed. The total spending for all 
major party House candidates in the 1976 election was $60 million; 
in the 2012 election, the total spending for all major party House 
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candidates was $923 million.253 The point is that with the extreme 
changes that have occurred in the election landscape perhaps a reex-
amination of the campaign finance jurisprudence is warranted—par-
ticularly certain premises unexamined since they were put forth in 
Buckley. Also, a recommitment to the robust enforcement and pas-
sage of laws could solve many issues that face the campaign finance 
jurisprudence. 
A.  Reexamination of Campaign Finance Jurisprudence 
1. DOES MONEY EQUAL SPEECH? 
One of the widely accepted progeny of Buckley that should be 
reexamined is the idea that money is speech.254 This is a largely re-
jected concept by supporters of campaign finance regulation.255 The 
rationale behind First Amendment protection for political spending 
is reasonable. In Buckley, the Court recognized that a restriction on 
political spending de facto reduces the quantity, depth, and size of 
any desired expression.256 Therefore, campaign finance restrictions 
must pass constitutional muster in order to stand because they are an 
infringement on First Amendment rights. 
However, within this discussion it must not be forgotten that the 
restrictions, which campaign finance regulations target, are on 
spending.257 Although money is speech, it is a special category of 
speech different from the pure speech258 that the First Amendment 
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was originally designed to protect.259 The idea that money equals 
speech—while valid—is a legal fiction.260 The current trend of cam-
paign finance decisions since Citizens United grants more protection 
to this legal fiction than to pure speech. This fact is particularly trou-
bling as applied to corporations—whose ability to speak is also a 
legal fiction—because it stacks legal fiction upon legal fiction to the 
detriment of society as a whole.261 
Contrary to the Court’s current First Amendment interpretation, 
there are numerous instances where the government is allowed to 
restrict the First Amendment rights of a speaker.262 Further, all of 
these instances limit pure or symbolic speech. So, if a principal can 
regulate her students’ off-campus support of “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS,”263 then why is Congress prevented from regulating the bil-
lions of dollars paid to candidates for public office? 
An interesting aside, which cannot be resolved by the current 
commitment to an absolute interpretation of the money-equals-
speech fiction, concerns those who do not have money. If money 
equals speech, then can those without money speak?264 The Buckley 
Court noted that “[t]he First Amendment’s protection against gov-
ernmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made 
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to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discus-
sion.”265 Thus, how can First Amendment protection unquestion-
ingly extend to a category that is completely dependent on an indi-
vidual’s financial ability to speak? 
In reality, the concept that money equals speech is logical. How-
ever, an absolute acceptance of this concept without consideration 
that it is a legal fiction, which recent Court decisions seem to indi-
cate, is troublesome. 
2. DOES THE STATE HAVE AN INTEREST IN EQUALIZING SPEECH? 
Another unexamined premise from the Buckley decision was 
that the state does not have an interest in equalizing the political 
sphere.266 The Court’s statement, which attempts to equalize the 
ability of speakers to influence elections are “wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment,” was dicta.267 Further, the cases that were dis-
cussed as support for this concept dealt with statutes, which required 
or prevented newspapers from supporting or opposing candidates 
for election.268 
Admittedly, it does seem foreign to the First Amendment to limit 
the ability of one speaker to enhance the ability of others to speak. 
However, given the current campaign finance landscape, perhaps 
that is what the First Amendment requires. As discussed above,269 
the anti-distortion interest is similar to leveling the playing field. 
However, one key difference is that the anti-distortion interest is 
concerned with preventing an individual or group from dominating 
the forum for political speech, which is not necessarily attempting 
to make all speakers equal.270 Therefore, it seems to fulfill the pur-
poses of the First Amendment, which the Buckley Court described 
as “secur[ing] ‘the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . .’”271 
It is possible that the Buckley Court’s statement about leveling 
the playing field is as true today as it was in 1976. However, the 
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anti-distortion interest is a middle ground between the two ap-
proaches. This interest maintains the principle from Buckley that the 
state is prohibited from equalizing the voices of all speakers. At the 
same time, the anti-distortion interest recognizes the real shortcom-
ings of campaign finance law and seeks to correct them. 
American voters have become disillusioned with the electoral 
process.272 There could be many different explanations for this phe-
nomenon; however, one point of agreement on this issue should be 
that the government—and society as a whole—has an interest in 
voter participation. One way that voters become engaged in the pro-
cess is by having candidates who engage the electorate. The demo-
cratic integrity framework recognized this reality. Thus, Justice 
Souter—in his WRTL II dissent—noted that “[d]evoting concentra-
tions of money in self-interested hands to the support of political 
campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to 
represent its constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their 
capacity to govern themselves.”273 The anti-distortion interest is a 
way to resurrect the lofty ideals of the democratic integrity frame-
work and support Justice Souter’s opinion that “political integ-
rity . . . [has] a value second to none in a free society.”274 But if 
candidates and elected officials are more concerned with fundrais-
ing, and massive fundraising becomes a prerequisite for a successful 
campaign, then the quality of candidates will change. Instead of 
elections composed of candidates with popular political philoso-
phies, ideas, and good merit, American elections will continually 
become a race to build massive war chests for campaign funds and 
flooding the airwaves with unceasing advertisements. American 
voter disillusionment can be seen everywhere, from low voter turn-
out numbers to popular culture,275 and until the Court recognizes a 
                                                                                                             
 272 Dylan Stableford, Voter Turnout for 2014 Midterms Worst in 72 Years, 
YAHOO! NEWS, Nov. 12, 2014, 9:34 AM, http://news.yahoo.com/voter-turnout-
2014-midterms-worst-in-72-years-143406756.html (noting that only 36.3 percent 
of eligible voters voted in the 2014 midterm elections, which was the worst turn-
out since the 1942 election). 
 273 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2689 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 274 Id. 
 275 Even the popular television show South Park has waded into this discus-
sion. During one episode, South Park satirically portrayed all American elections, 
386 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:348 
 
state interest—like the anti-distortion interest—that allows Con-
gress to regulate campaign finance, then quality political candidates 
will continue to elude the American public. 
Although this Comment may seem critical of politicians, which 
is certainly deserved in some instances, there is not a lack of appre-
ciation for their difficult position. Because of the current structure 
of the campaign finance jurisprudence, politicians are allowed to en-
gage in massive fundraising efforts, and it is only reasonable for 
them to do so. However, this reality places a burden on politicians 
to actually raise the money and in that pursuit promises may need to 
be made to donors. To further complicate matters, any savvy politi-
cian fresh off an electoral victory should immediately begin thinking 
about the next election. Given the fact that he or she will need to 
raise money again, that politician cannot forget the people who put 
him or her in office or the fact that those people can give their money 
to someone else. 
While the state does not have a legitimate interest in equalizing 
the speech of all people, it does have an interest in making sure that 
everyone has the opportunity to speak. The anti-distortion interest 
accomplishes this goal by preventing the domination of the forum 
for speech by a relatively small group. 
B. Recommitment to Legislation 
One question, which looms large over the discussion of cam-
paign finance reform, is how can reform be accomplished?276 Many 
people claim that the current trend of deregulating campaign finance 
laws has left what remains ineffective, which provides a bleak out-
look for campaign finance reform.277 Some interesting approaches 
have been suggested to deal with the problems introduced by the 
Court’s decisions, which will be discussed below. However, the 
most apt approach would be to give teeth to the laws that are already 
in place and recognize anti-distortion as its own compelling state 
interest. 
                                                                                                             
from grade-school mascot elections to presidential elections, as a choice be-
tween—in the interest of civility what I will describe as—Scylla and Charybdis. 
South Park: Douche and Turd (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 27, 
2004). 
 276 See Kang, supra note 93. 
 277 See id. at 51. 
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Generally, the history of campaign finance regulations has been 
concerned with ex ante approaches.278 However, an ex ante ap-
proach raises constitutional problems because such a regulation “re-
stricts political speech.”279 One way to avoid this difficulty is to fo-
cus instead on ex post regulations, which target the influence of cam-
paign contributions and expenditures after the fact.280 This approach 
is attractive because it avoids the constitutional difficulty, while at 
the same time targeting the actual corruption that the anti-corruption 
interest attempts to prohibit.281 Further, the Court has been sympa-
thetic to this approach in recent cases.282 In Caperton v. Massey, a 
judge was recused because a “campaign supporter’s case arrived be-
fore the elected candidate.”283 Similar to Caperton, an ex post ap-
proach would focus on regulating the actions of public officials once 
they are in office. Thus, the ex post approach would reduce the in-
centive of the official or others to resort to corrupting measures. 
The ex post approach is logical and has many attractive compo-
nents. However, one major flaw with this approach, which it could 
not take into account, is the exclusion of a separate anti-distortion 
interest. The allure of this approach is, in part, due to the fact that it 
could realistically be employed within the current campaign finance 
jurisprudence, without overturning any precedent. Given the unlike-
lihood that the current Court would reverse its trend of narrowing 
the scope of campaign finance regulation, perhaps this is the most 
reasonable way forward. But that which is reasonable is not always 
that which is necessary. 
Republican theory284 views public deliberation as an inherent 
good in a political system.285 Deliberation is a process of cultivating 
civic virtue through political participation and is an end in and of 
                                                                                                             
 278 See id. at 56. 
 279 Id. at 57. 
 280 See id. at 55–58. 
 281 See id. 
 282 Id. (citations omitted). 
 283 See Id. at 57. 
 284 This phrase and the term “republicanism” will be used interchangeably. It 
should be noted that these terms refer to the political philosophy and not to the 
American political party. 
 285 See, e.g., Republicanism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Apr. 
15, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/. 
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itself, not a means to improve public policy.286 Republican theorists 
view political preferences as endogenous, meaning they are only 
formed after public deliberation.287 Without an approach to cam-
paign finance that takes into account the anti-distortion interest, 
these republican ideals—to which founding fathers Jefferson and 
Madison subscribed288—are lost. The ex post approach is valid and 
should be pursued to reinvest in the battle against public official cor-
ruption. However, ex ante approaches, such as the anti-distortion in-
terest, are necessary because of their importance to the political pro-
cess. 
As discussed above, the most important new way forward in the 
area of campaign finance is a recognition of anti-distortion as a com-
pelling state interest. Recognition of this interest would revitalize 
many existing statutes such as FECA and BCRA. This would enable 
them to combat corruption and ensure that American elections are 
representative of the issues and interests of the American people. 
While this recognition would be difficult to achieve, it would be ex-
tremely beneficial. 
Political discourse was once an ideal aspired to in the United 
States. The anti-distortion interest is simply a way of recommitting 
to that ideal by allowing Congress to curb the influence that money 
has on the outcome of elections. The FECA and BCRA statutes were 
attempts by Congress to restrict monetary influence, but the Court 
somehow saw this as a way to suppress speech. The Court’s usurpa-
tion of the legislature’s role in campaign finance regulation and its 
claim of authority for “judicial pre-clearance” is troublesome.289 
Further, it flies in the face of Justice Breyer’s words in his Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC concurrence that “the legislature understands the 
problem—the threat to electoral integrity, the need for democratiza-
tion—better than do we.”290 Voices can be heard by elected officials 
from behind the marble columns of the Supreme Court building, but 
for the ordinary American voter, the Court’s rejection of the anti-
                                                                                                             
 286 See, e.g., id. 
 287 See, e.g., id. 
 288 See, e.g., id. 
 289 See Hill, supra note 77, at 301. 
 290 Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)). 
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distortion interest is just another erosion of the chain of communi-
cation so vital to a functioning democracy. 
Elections are essential to a functional democracy, and in order 
for elections to capture the will of the people, different viewpoints 
must be heard. This is one of the reasons that the First Amendment 
was drafted and, in defense of the Amendment’s spirit, it is also one 
of the many reasons that the anti-distortion interest should be recog-
nized. 
CONCLUSION 
Campaign finance is a controversial area of law. It seems that 
many people have an opinion on the matter, although few know the 
necessary language required to make any sophisticated legal argu-
ments. This fact is evidence that there is a lot at stake and that this 
issue is larger than editorials or law review articles. Campaign fi-
nance law goes to the heart of how the American people view and 
perceive their government. If those people lose faith in their govern-
ment, then they will not participate in it. Without citizen participa-
tion, we risk losing Thomas Jefferson’s dream of the Great Ameri-
can Republic and his words would fall upon deaf ears: “Where every 
man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic . . . and feels 
that he is a participator in the government of affairs, not merely at 
an election one day in the year, but every day . . . .”291 
                                                                                                             
 291 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s34.html. 
